Ivory Burning: Will It Stop Elephant Poaching?

Elephant tusks and rhino horns set ablaze at Nairobi National Park

On April 30, President Uhuru Kenyatta set blazing 15 tons of elephant tusks and rhino horns at the Nairobi National Park. These illicit wildlife goods are estimated to worth over $172 million and represent to about dead 8,000 elephants and 343 rhino. The move was aimed at protecting the elephant and the rhino that have been endangered by lucrative illicit ivory business.  As indicated by the African Wildlife Foundation, approximately 470,000 African elephants left in the wild are endangered. According to the Kenya Wildlife Service, Kenya lost 164 elephants to poachers in 2015, and 302 in 2013 and 384 in 2012. The illegal ivory trade is a very lucrative and that is the reason why the business is still thriving despite the local and international efforts to bring it to a halt. Even after the global ban on ivory trade in 1989, the killing of wildlife still continues alarmingly. The interception of the ivory is a common success indicator of the governments’ anti-poaching efforts. Even though the interception reduces the supply of ivory into the illegal trade and penalizes the smugglers, these efforts do not entirely stop the actual problem of unlawful killings of elephants.
Just like other countries, Kenya has adopted the common strategy of burning ivory stockpiles as this reduces the motivation for people to take part in smuggling by eliminating the ivory from the market. The practice started in 1989 when tons of ivory were set ablaze by the former president Daniel Arap Moi. The Kenya’s elephants were greatly threatened at the time as their number reduced to 16,000 from 167,000 in 1973. The move reversed the decline and the elephant population in Kenya currently stand at approximately 38,000. In 2011, former President Mwai Kibaki also set on 5 tons of tusks. Even though burning ivory stockpiles appears to be a positive move as it creates awareness about the illicit trade, the impact from observation may not be that much in deterring poaching. Despite inadequate data to support this view, it is evident that the poaching of elephants has increased. This, therefore, brings up the question whether destroying ivory is an effective approach to reducing poaching. The strategy appears to have increased poaching, on the contrary.
The issues surrounding ivory trade are complex and hard to disentangle. From the economic theory, destroying ivory stockpiles reduces its supply into the market thereby increasing the worth of available stocks. This, in turn, increases the expected return from poaching thus driving more poaching. The failure of the burning strategy in saving elephants has brought up discussion around the adoption of the market-based approach. The anti-poaching efforts appear to be directed towards the poachers, who are just the symptoms of the problem, rather than the economic drivers and its global demands that are the cause.   Destroying ivory stockpiles only reduce supply, but not demand. I tend to dissent with the idea that the ivory destruction will drive the prices and poaching higher. How can the supply be affected by the commodity that is not yet on the market? The burning of ivory just sends a message that killing these animals for ivory is unacceptable. Putting the confiscated ivory into the market would create more illegal ivory laundering. This would increase elephant poaching and stimulate even more demand for ivory. Unless the market mechanisms governing the supply and demand are considered as the primary problem, and psychological and economic remedies applied, elephant’s survival have no future.  The problem is the demand for ivory. Combating the supply through law enforcement is basically futile, even though it could marginally slow down the killing of elephants by apprehending a few of those involved.
Some groups have suggested that the confiscated ivory should be flooded into the market to reduce the prices of the ivory drastically purposely to discourage poachers from taking the risk. At the moment, the poachers are willing to take the risk of being shot by game wardens as the tusks are expensive. By attacking the key motivator, “High Return,” the poacher and everyone involved in the chain will not risk their lives for poaching. I disagree with this point of view. The move is only effective in shorter term but the moment the stockpiles of low-priced ivory are exhausted, the demand that had been increased by cheap ivory will ripe the market for criminal vultures and speculators. In addition, the governments selling the ivory would be seen legitimizing the illegal ivory trade.The economic theory predicts that the command and control nature of anti-poaching policies usually lead to abhorrent outcomes.
The market-based solutions can be helpful in handling elephant poaching as it has been effective in some cases such as Private Game Park. The provision of property rights to individuals has motivated individuals to protect and preserve best populations of the animals. The absence of clearly defined and implementable ownership right is the root problem with conservation. The lack of clearly distinct and protected rights is a primary cause of poaching not only in Kenya but also in other African countries. The communities around the game reserves are often excluded from benefiting from the wildlife. This makes these communities see no value in wildlife and instead get motivated to collaborate with poachers.
The market-based approach appears to offer a feasible and long-term solution to the problem of elephants poaching. Transferring of ownership rights to surrounding communities would give them a strong incentive to protect the wildlife. The local community must be engaged in the managing these reserves as this will make them more watchful in their anti-poaching endeavors. The direct involvement of these communities in the reserves policing would make poaching undesirable by increasing the risks involved. The government should focus on elevating these communities from poverty that is a great driver to poaching. The communities should be deliberately supported through policy to get involved in the lucrative businesses such as hotels ownership operating within the game reserves, a business dominated by international chains. Let the communities operate the tourist campsites to get revenue and poaching will decrease drastically.  A viable option to poaching menace is increasing the communities’ involvement in conservation efforts. The poachers within the community may turn into fierce wildlife protectors.
The burning of ivory is not a remedy to poaching even though it is symbolically important. It does not address the problem linked to common pool resources. The burning of ivory is necessary, but more useful policies must focus on using more market-based strategies that give communities the ownership rights to the wildlife. This will perhaps compel these communities to robustly support anti-poaching activities. Viably, regaining the trust of Asian traders to stop buying ivory and governments to ban completely ivory trade appears to be a better solution. Importantly, public awareness campaigns across Asia may also drive the demand for ivory down by creating an enormous stigma related to owning ivory.